225 - Confesssion in Bahasa Malaysia
224 - Confesssion - Wisdom of The East
Title: The Confessions
of Al Ghazzali
Author: Ghazzali
Editor: L. Cranmer-Byng
S. A. Kapadia
Translator: Claud Field
Release date: February
27, 2019
Language: English
Credits: Produced by
Fritz Ohrenschall and the Online Distributed
(This file was produced
from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive)
[1]
The Wisdom of the East
Series
Edited by L. CRANMER-BYNG
Dr. S. A. KAPADIA
THE CONFESSIONS OF AL
GHAZZALI
[2]
“He who knows himself
knows God.”
Sayings of Muhammed.
[3]
WISDOM OF THE EAST
THE CONFESSIONS OF AL
GHAZZALI
TRANSLATED FOR THE
FIRST TIME INTO ENGLISH
BY CLAUD FIELD, M.A.
Drawing of the sun
rising in the east
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE
STREET, W.
1909
[4]
PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND
VINEY, LD.
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.
[5]
CONTENTS
PAGE
Introduction 7
Ghazzali’s Search for
Truth 11
The Subterfuges of the
Sophists 15
The Different Kinds of
Seekers after Truth 20
The Aim of Scholastic
Theology and its Results 21
Concerning the
Philosophical Sects and the Stigma of Infidelity which attaches to them all 25
Divisions of the
Philosophic Sciences 27
Sufism 41
The Reality of
Inspiration: its Importance for the Human Race 50
[6]
EDITORIAL NOTE
The object of the
Editors of this series is a very definite one. They desire above all things
that, in their humble way, these books shall be the ambassadors of good-will
and understanding between East and West—the old world of Thought and the new of
Action. In this endeavour, and in their own sphere, they are but followers of
the highest example in the land. They are confident that a deeper knowledge of
the great ideals and lofty philosophy of Oriental thought may help to a revival
of that true spirit of Charity which neither despises nor fears the nations of
another creed and colour. Finally, in thanking press and public for the very
cordial reception given to the “Wisdom of the East” Series, they wish to state
that no pains have been spared to secure the best specialists for the treatment
of the various subjects at hand.
L. CRANMER-BYNG.
S. A. KAPADIA.
Northbrook Society, 185
Piccadilly, W.
[7]
Birth of Ghazzali
Aboû Hâmid Muhammed Ibn Muhammad Al Ghazzali was born in the
city of Tus in Khorassan, a.d. 1058, one year after the great poet and
freethinker Abu’ l’ Alā died. He was the son of a dealer in cotton thread
(Gazzâl), whence his name. Losing his father in early life, he was confided to
the care of a Sufi, whose influence extended through his subsequent career. On
finishing his studies he was appointed professor of theology at Bagdad. Here he
achieved such splendid success that all the Imāms became his zealous partisans.
So great, indeed, was his renown, so ardent the admiration he inspired, that
the Muhammedans sometimes said: “If all the books of Islam were destroyed, it
would be but a slight loss, provided Al Ghazzali’s work on the Revivification
of the Sciences of Religion were preserved.” The following short treatise
gives[8] the history of the mind of this remarkable man in his pursuit of
truth. It might not inaptly bear the title “Confessions of an Inquiring
Spirit.” In its intellectual subtlety it bears a certain resemblance to
Newman’s Grammar of Assent, and in its almost Puritanical sense of the terrors
of the world to come, it is akin to Bunyan’s Grace Abounding. It is also
interesting as being one of the very few specimens of genuine Eastern
autobiography.
After describing the difficulty with which he escaped from an
almost Pyrrhonic scepticism, “not by systematic reasoning and accumulation of
proofs, but by a flash of light which God sent into my soul,” he reviews the
various sects whom he encountered in his search for truth.
I. The scholastic theologians, who profess to follow reason and
speculation.
II. The philosophers, who call themselves masters of Logic and
Demonstration.
III. The Sufis, who claim an immediate intuition, and who
perceive the real manifestation of truth as common men perceive material
phenomena.
After mastering the first two systems and still finding the
great problem unsolved, he was forced to pronounce philosophy incompetent, and
to seek in some higher faculty than reason the solution of his doubts. The
intuition or ecstasy (“wajd”) of the Sufis was to him a sort[9] of revelation.
His search for truth occupied several years, in the course of which he
renounced his professorship of theology at Bagdad and went into devotional
retirement at Jerusalem and Damascus, and also performed the pilgrimage to
Mecca.
He returned for a short time to Nishapur, the birthplace of Omar
Khayyām, his elder contemporary, whom, as Professor Browne tells us in his
History of Persian Literature, he met and disliked. He finally went back to
Tus, his native place, where he died, a.d. 1111. Professor D. B. Macdonald, in
an article on Ghazzali in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, quotes
the following account of his death as related by his brother Ahmad: “On Monday
at dawn my brother performed the ablution and prayed. Then he said, ‘Bring me
my grave-clothes,’ and he took them and kissed them, and laid them on his eyes
and said, ‘I hear and obey the command to go into the King.’ And he stretched
out his feet and went to meet Him and was taken to the good-will of God Most
High.”
The great service which Al Ghazzali rendered to the Sufis was,
as Mr. Whinfield has pointed out, in the preface to his translation of the
Masnavi, to provide them with a metaphysical terminology which he had derived
from the writings of Plotinus the Neo-Platonist. He also gave them a secure
position in the Church of Islam.
[10]
In his Development of Muslim Theology Professor Macdonald calls
Ghazzali “the greatest, certainly the most sympathetic figure in the history of
Islam, and the only teacher of the after generations ever put by a Muslim on a
level with the four great Imāms.” He further says of him: “Islam has never
outgrown him, has never fully understood him. In the renaissance of Islam which
is now rising to view, his time will come, and the new life will proceed from a
renewed study of his works.”
C. F.
[11]
THE CONFESSIONS OF AL
GHAZZALI
Ghazzali’s Search for
Truth
“In the name of the
most merciful God.”
Quoth the Imām
Ghazzali:
Glory be to God, Whose
praise should precede every writing and every speech! May the blessings of God
rest on Muhammed His Prophet and His Apostle, on his family and companions, by
whose guidance error is escaped!
You have asked me, O
brother in the faith, to expound the aim and the mysteries of religious
sciences, the boundaries and depths of theological doctrines. You wish to know
my experiences while disentangling truth lost in the medley of sects and
divergencies of thought, and how I have dared to climb from the low levels of
traditional belief to the topmost summit of assurance. You desire to learn what
I have borrowed, first of all from scholastic theology; and secondly from[12]
the method of the Ta’limites, who, in seeking truth, rest upon the authority of
a leader; and why, thirdly, I have been led to reject philosophic systems; and
finally, what I have accepted of the doctrine of the Sufis, and the sum total
of truth which I have gathered in studying every variety of opinion. You ask me
why, after resigning at Bagdad a teaching post which attracted a number of
hearers, I have, long afterwards, accepted a similar one at Nishapur. Convinced
as I am of the sincerity which prompts your inquiries, I proceed to answer
them, invoking the help and protection of God.
Know then, my brothers
(may God direct you in the right way), that the diversity in beliefs and
religions, and the variety of doctrines and sects which divide men, are like a
deep ocean strewn with shipwrecks, from which very few escape safe and sound.
Each sect, it is true, believes itself in possession of the truth and of
salvation, “each party,” as the Koran saith, “rejoices in its own creed”; but
as the chief of the apostles, whose word is always truthful, has told us, “My
people will be divided into more than seventy sects, of whom only one will be
saved.” This prediction, like all others of the Prophet, must be fulfilled.
From the period of
adolescence, that is to say, previous to reaching my twentieth year to the
present time when I have passed my fiftieth, I[13] have ventured into this vast
ocean; I have fearlessly sounded its depths, and, like a resolute diver, I have
penetrated its darkness and dared its dangers and abysses. I have interrogated
the beliefs of each sect and scrutinised the mysteries of each doctrine, in
order to disentangle truth from error and orthodoxy from heresy. I have never
met one who maintained the hidden meaning of the Koran without investigating
the nature of his belief, nor a partisan of its exterior sense without
inquiring into the results of his doctrine. There is no philosopher whose
system I have not fathomed, nor theologian the intricacies of whose doctrine I
have not followed out.
Sufism has no secrets
into which I have not penetrated; the devout adorer of Deity has revealed to me
the aim of his austerities; the atheist has not been able to conceal from me
the real reason of his unbelief. The thirst for knowledge was innate in me from
an early age; it was like a second nature implanted by God, without any will on
my part. No sooner had I emerged from boyhood than I had already broken the
fetters of tradition and freed myself from hereditary beliefs.
Having noticed how
easily the children of Christians become Christians, and the children of
Moslems embrace Islam, and remembering also the traditional saying ascribed to
the Prophet, “Every child has in him the germ of Islam, then[14] his parents
make him Jew, Christian, or Zoroastrian,” I was moved by a keen desire to learn
what was this innate disposition in the child, the nature of the accidental
beliefs imposed on him by the authority of his parents and his masters, and
finally the unreasoned convictions which he derives from their instructions.
Struck with the
contradictions which I encountered in endeavouring to disentangle the truth and
falsehood of these opinions, I was led to make the following reflection: “The
search after truth being the aim which I propose to myself, I ought in the
first place to ascertain what are the bases of certitude.” In the next place I
recognised that certitude is the clear and complete knowledge of things, such
knowledge as leaves no room for doubt nor possibility of error and conjecture,
so that there remains no room in the mind for error to find an entrance. In
such a case it is necessary that the mind, fortified against all possibility of
going astray, should embrace such a strong conviction that, if, for example,
any one possessing the power of changing a stone into gold, or a stick into a
serpent, should seek to shake the bases of this certitude, it would remain firm
and immovable. Suppose, for instance, a man should come and say to me, who am
firmly convinced that ten is more than three, “No; on the contrary, three is
more than ten, and, to prove it, I change this rod into a serpent,[15]” and
supposing that he actually did so, I should remain none the less convinced of
the falsity of his assertion, and although his miracle might arouse my
astonishment, it would not instil any doubt into my belief.
I then understood that
all forms of knowledge which do not unite these conditions (imperviousness to
doubt, etc.) do not deserve any confidence, because they are not beyond the
reach of doubt, and what is not impregnable to doubt cannot constitute
certitude.
The Subterfuges of the
Sophists
I then examined what
knowledge I possessed, and discovered that in none of it, with the exception of
sense-perceptions and necessary principles, did I enjoy that degree of
certitude which I have just described. I then sadly reflected as follows: “We
cannot hope to find truth except in matters which carry their evidence in
themselves—that is to say, in sense-perceptions and necessary principles; we
must therefore establish these on a firm basis. Is my absolute confidence in
sense-perceptions and on the infallibility of necessary principles analogous to
the confidence which I formerly possessed in matters believed on the authority
of others? Is it only analogous to the reliance most people place on[16] their
organs of vision, or is it rigorously true without admixture of illusion or
doubt?”
I then set myself
earnestly to examine the notions we derive from the evidence of the senses and
from sight in order to see if they could be called in question. The result of a
careful examination was that my confidence in them was shaken. Our sight for
instance, perhaps the best practised of all our senses, observes a shadow, and
finding it apparently stationary pronounces it devoid of movement. Observation
and experience, however, show subsequently that a shadow moves not suddenly, it
is true, but gradually and imperceptibly, so that it is never really
motionless.
Again, the eye sees a
star and believes it as large as a piece of gold, but mathematical calculations
prove, on the contrary, that it is larger than the earth. These notions, and
all others which the senses declare true, are subsequently contradicted and
convicted of falsity in an irrefragable manner by the verdict of reason.
Then I reflected in
myself: “Since I cannot trust to the evidence of my senses, I must rely only on
intellectual notions based on fundamental principles, such as the following
axioms: ‘Ten is more than three. Affirmation and negation cannot coexist
together. A thing cannot both be created and also existent from eternity,
living and annihilated simultaneously, at once necessary[17] and impossible.’”
To this the notions I derived from my senses made the following objections:
“Who can guarantee you that you can trust to the evidence of reason more than
to that of the senses? You believed in our testimony till it was contradicted
by the verdict of reason, otherwise you would have continued to believe it to
this day. Well, perhaps, there is above reason another judge who, if he
appeared, would convict reason of falsehood, just as reason has confuted us.
And if such a third arbiter is not yet apparent, it does not follow that he
does not exist.”
To this argument I
remained some time without reply; a reflection drawn from the phenomena of
sleep deepened my doubt. “Do you not see,” I reflected, “that while asleep you
assume your dreams to be indisputably real? Once awake, you recognise them for
what they are—baseless chimeras. Who can assure you, then, of the reliability
of notions which, when awake, you derive from the senses and from reason? In
relation to your present state they may be real; but it is possible also that
you may enter upon another state of being which will bear the same relation to
your present state as this does to your condition when asleep. In that new
sphere you will recognise that the conclusions of reason are only chimeras.”
This possible condition
is, perhaps, that which[18] the Sufis call “ecstasy” (“hāl”), that is to say,
according to them, a state in which, absorbed in themselves and in the
suspension of sense-perceptions, they have visions beyond the reach of
intellect. Perhaps also Death is that state, according to that saying of the
Prince of prophets: “Men are asleep; when they die, they wake.” Our present
life in relation to the future is perhaps only a dream, and man, once dead,
will see things in direct opposition to those now before his eyes; he will then
understand that word of the Koran, “To-day we have removed the veil from thine
eyes and thy sight is keen.”
Such thoughts as these
threatened to shake my reason, and I sought to find an escape from them. But
how? In order to disentangle the knot of this difficulty, a proof was
necessary. Now a proof must be based on primary assumptions, and it was
precisely these of which I was in doubt. This unhappy state lasted about two
months, during which I was, not, it is true, explicitly or by profession, but
morally and essentially a thoroughgoing sceptic.
God at last deigned to
heal me of this mental malady; my mind recovered sanity and equilibrium, the primary
assumptions of reason recovered with me all their stringency and force. I owed
my deliverance, not to a concatenation of proofs and arguments, but to the
light which God caused to penetrate into my heart—the light which[19]
illuminates the threshold of all knowledge. To suppose that certitude can be
only based upon formal arguments is to limit the boundless mercy of God. Some
one asked the Prophet the explanation of this passage in the Divine Book: “God
opens to Islam the heart of him whom He chooses to direct.” “That is spoken,”
replied the Prophet, “of the light which God sheds in the heart.” “And how can
man recognise that light?” he was asked. “By his detachment from this world of
illusion and by a secret drawing towards the eternal world,” the Prophet
replied.
On another occasion he
said: “God has created His creatures in darkness, and then has shed upon them
His light.” It is by the help of this light that the search for truth must be
carried on. As by His mercy this light descends from time to time among men, we
must ceaselessly be on the watch for it. This is also corroborated by another
saying of the Apostle: “God sends upon you, at certain times, breathings of His
grace; be prepared for them.”
My object in this
account is to make others understand with what earnestness we should search for
truth, since it leads to results we never dreamt of. Primary assumptions have
not got to be sought for, since they are always present to our minds; if we
engage in such a search, we only find them persistently elude our grasp.[20]
But those who push their investigation beyond ordinary limits are safe from the
suspicion of negligence in pursuing what is within their reach.
The Different Kinds of
Seekers after Truth
When God in the
abundance of His mercy had healed me of this malady, I ascertained that those
who are engaged in the search for truth may be divided into three groups.
I. Scholastic
theologians, who profess to follow theory and speculation.
II. The Philosophers,
who profess to rely upon formal logic.
III. The Sufis, who
call themselves the elect of God and possessors of intuition and knowledge of
the truth by means of ecstasy.
“The truth,” I said to
myself, “must be found among these three classes of men who devote themselves
to the search for it. If it escapes them, one must give up all hope of
attaining it. Having once surrendered blind belief, it is impossible to return
to it, for the essence of such belief is to be unconscious of itself. As soon
as this unconsciousness ceases it is shattered like a glass whose fragments
cannot be again reunited except by being cast again into the furnace and[21]
refashioned.” Determined to follow these paths and to search out these systems
to the bottom, I proceeded with my investigations in the following order:
Scholastic theology; philosophical systems; and, finally Sufism.
The Aim of Scholastic
Theology and its Results
Commencing with
theological science, I carefully studied and meditated upon it. I read the
writings of the authorities in this department and myself composed several
treatises. I recognised that this science, while sufficing its own
requirements, could not assist me in arriving at the desired goal. In short,
its object is to preserve the purity of orthodox beliefs from all heretical
innovation. God, by means of His Apostle, has revealed to His creatures a
belief which is true as regards their temporal and eternal interests; the chief
articles of it are laid down in the Koran and in the traditions. Subsequently,
Satan suggested to innovators principles contrary to those of orthodoxy; they
listened greedily to his suggestions, and the purity of the faith was menaced.
God then raised up a school of theologians and inspired them with the desire to
defend orthodoxy by means of a system of proofs adapted to unveil the devices
of the heretics and to foil the attacks which they made on the doctrines
established by tradition.
[22]
Such is the origin of
scholastic theology. Many of its adepts, worthy of their high calling,
valiantly defended the orthodox faith by proving the reality of prophecy and
the falsity of heretical innovations. But, in order to do so, they had to rely
upon a certain number of premises, which they accepted in common with their
adversaries, and which authority and universal consent or simply the Koran and
the traditions obliged them to accept. Their principal effort was to expose the
self-contradictions of their opponents and to confute them by means of the
premises which they had professed to accept. Now a method of argumentation like
this has little value for one who only admits self-evident truths. Scholastic
theology could not consequently satisfy me nor heal the malady from which I
suffered.
It is true that in its
later development theology was not content merely to defend dogma; it betook
itself to the study of first principles, of substances, accidents and the laws
which govern them; but through want of a thoroughly scientific basis, it could
not advance far in its researches, nor succeed in dispelling entirely the
overhanging obscurity which springs from diversities of belief.
I do not, however, deny
that it has had a more satisfactory result for others; on the contrary, I admit
that it has; but it is by introducing the principle of authority in matters
which are not self-evident. Moreover, my object is to explain[23] my own mental
attitude and not to dispute with those who have found healing for themselves.
Remedies vary according to the nature of the disease; those which benefit some
may injure others.
Philosophy.—How far it is
open to censure or not—On what points its adherents may be considered believers
or unbelievers, orthodox or heretical—What they have borrowed from the true
doctrine to render their chimerical theories acceptable—Why the minds of men
swerve from the truth—What criteria are available wherewith to separate the
pure gold from the alloy in their systems.
I proceeded from the
study of scholastic theology to that of philosophy. It was plain to me that, in
order to discover where the professors of any branch of knowledge have erred,
one must make a profound study of that science; must equal, nay surpass, those
who know most of it, so as to penetrate into secrets of it unknown to them.
Only by this method can they be completely answered, and of this method I can find
no trace in the theologians of Islam. In theological writings devoted to the
refutation of philosophy I have only found a tangled mass of phrases full of
contradictions and mistakes, and incapable of deceiving, I will not say a
critical mind, but even the common crowd. Convinced that to dream[24] of
refuting a doctrine before having thoroughly comprehended it was like shooting
at an object in the dark, I devoted myself zealously to the study of
philosophy; but in books only and without the aid of a teacher. I gave up to
this work all the leisure remaining from teaching and from composing works on
law. There were then attending my lectures three hundred of the students of
Bagdad. With the help of God, these studies, carried on in secret, so to speak,
put me in a condition to thoroughly comprehend philosophical systems within a
space of two years. I then spent about a year in meditating on these systems
after having thoroughly understood them. I turned them over and over in my mind
till they were thoroughly clear of all obscurity. In this manner I acquired a
complete knowledge of all their subterfuges and subtleties, of what was truth
and what was illusion in them.
I now proceed to give a
resumé of these doctrines. I ascertained that they were divided into different
varieties, and that their adherents might be ranged under diverse heads. All,
in spite of their diversity, are marked with the stamp of infidelity and
irreligion, although there is a considerable difference between the ancient and
modern, between the first and last of these philosophers, according as they
have missed or approximated to the truth in a greater or less degree.
[25]
Concerning the
Philosophical Sects and the Stigma of Infidelity which attaches to them all
The philosophical
systems, in spite of their number and variety, may be reduced to three: (1) The
Materialists; (2) The Naturalists; (3) The Theists.
(1) The Materialists.
They reject an intelligent and omnipotent Creator and Disposer of the Universe.
In their view the world exists from all eternity and had no author. The animal
comes from semen and semen from the animal; so it has always been and will
always be; those who maintain this doctrine are atheists.
(2) The Naturalists.
These devote themselves to the study of nature and of the marvellous phenomena
of the animal and vegetable world. Having carefully analysed animal organs with
the help of anatomy, struck with the wonders of God’s work and with the wisdom
therein revealed, they are forced to admit the existence of a wise Creator Who
knows the end and purpose of everything. And certainly no one can study anatomy
and the wonderful mechanism of living things without being obliged to confess
the profound wisdom of Him Who has framed the bodies of animals and especially
of man. But carried away by their natural researches they believed[26] that the
existence of a being absolutely depended upon the proper equilibrium of its
organism. According to them, as the latter perishes and is destroyed, so is the
thinking faculty which is bound up with it; and as they assert that the
restoration of a thing once destroyed to existence is unthinkable, they deny
the immortality of the soul. Consequently they deny heaven, hell, resurrection,
and judgment. Acknowledging neither a recompense for good deeds nor a
punishment for evil ones, they fling off all authority and plunge into sensual
pleasures with the avidity of brutes. These also ought to be called atheists,
for the true faith depends not only on the acknowledgment of God, but of His
Apostle and of the Day of Judgment. And although they acknowledge God and His
attributes, they deny a judgment to come.
(3) Next come the
Theists. Among them should be reckoned Socrates, who was the teacher of Plato
as Plato was of Aristotle. This latter drew up for his disciples the rules of
logic, organised the sciences, elucidated what was formerly obscure, and
expounded what had not been understood. This school refuted the systems of the
two others, i.e. the Materialists and Naturalists; but in exposing their mistaken
and perverse beliefs, they made use of arguments which they should not. “God
suffices to protect the faithful in war” (Koran, xxxiii. 25).
[27]
Aristotle also
contended with success against the theories of Plato, Socrates, and the theists
who had preceded him, and separated himself entirely from them; but he could
not eliminate from his doctrine the stains of infidelity and heresy which
disfigure the teaching of his predecessors. We should therefore consider them
all as unbelievers, as well as the so-called Mussulman philosophers, such as
Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Farabi, who have adopted their systems.
Let us, however,
acknowledge that among Mussulman philosophers none have better interpreted the
doctrine of Aristotle than the latter. What others have handed down as his
teaching is full of error, confusion, and obscurity adapted to disconcert the
reader. The unintelligible can neither be accepted nor rejected. The philosophy
of Aristotle, all serious knowledge of which we owe to the translation of these
two learned men, may be divided into three portions: the first contains matter
justly chargeable with impiety, the second is tainted with heresy, and the
third we are obliged to reject absolutely. We proceed to details:
Divisions of the
Philosophic Sciences
These sciences, in
relation to the aim we have set before us, may be divided into six sections:
(1) Mathematics; (2) Logic; (3) Physics; (4) Metaphysics; (5) Politics; (6)
Moral Philosophy.
[28]
Mathematics comprises
the knowledge of calculation, geometry, and cosmography: it has no connection
with the religious sciences, and proves nothing for or against religion; it
rests on a foundation of proofs which, once known and understood, cannot be
refuted. Mathematics tend, however, to produce two bad results.
The first is this:
Whoever studies this science admires the subtlety and clearness of its proofs.
His confidence in philosophy increases, and he thinks that all its departments
are capable of the same clearness and solidity of proof as mathematics. But
when he hears people speak of the unbelief and impiety of mathematicians, of
their professed disregard for the Divine Law, which is notorious, it is true
that, out of regard for authority, he echoes these accusations, but he says to
himself at the same time that, if there was truth in religion, it would not
have escaped those who have displayed so much keenness of intellect in the
study of mathematics.
Next, when he becomes
aware of the unbelief and rejection of religion on the part of these learned
men, he concludes that to reject religion is reasonable. How many of such men
gone astray I have met whose sole argument was that just mentioned. And
supposing one puts to them the following objection: “It does not follow that a
man who excels in one branch of knowledge excels in all others, nor that he
should be[29] equally versed in jurisprudence, theology, and medicine. It is
possible to be entirely ignorant of metaphysics, and yet to be an excellent
grammarian. There are past masters in every science who are entirely ignorant
of other branches of knowledge. The arguments of the ancient philosophers are
rigidly demonstrative in mathematics and only conjectural in religious
questions. In order to ascertain this one must proceed to a thorough examination
of the matter.” Supposing, I say, one makes the above objection to these “apes
of unbelief,” they find it distasteful. Falling a prey to their passions, to a
besotted vanity, and the wish to pass for learned men, they persist in
maintaining the pre-eminence of mathematicians in all branches of knowledge.
This is a serious evil, and for this reason those who study mathematics should
be checked from going too far in their researches. For though far removed as it
may be from the things of religion, this study, serving as it does as an
introduction to the philosophic systems, casts over religion its malign
influence. It is rarely that a man devotes himself to it without robbing
himself of his faith and casting off the restraints of religion.
The second evil comes
from the sincere but ignorant Mussulman who thinks the best way to defend
religion is by rejecting all the exact sciences. Accusing their professors of
being astray, he rejects their theories of the eclipses of[30] the sun and
moon, and condemns them in the name of religion. These accusations are carried
far and wide, they reach the ears of the philosopher who knows that these
theories rest on infallible proofs; far from losing confidence in them, he
believes, on the contrary, that Islam has ignorance and the denial of
scientific proofs for its basis, and his devotion to philosophy increases with
his hatred to religion.
It is therefore a great
injury to religion to suppose that the defence of Islam involves the
condemnation of the exact sciences. The religious law contains nothing which
approves them or condemns them, and in their turn they make no attack on
religion. The words of the Prophet, “The sun and the moon are two signs of the
power of God; they are not eclipsed for the birth or the death of any one; when
you see these signs take refuge in prayer and invoke the name of God”—these
words, I say, do not in any way condemn the astronomical calculations which
define the orbits of these two bodies, their conjunction and opposition
according to particular laws. But as for the so-called tradition, “When God
reveals Himself in anything, He abases Himself thereto,” it is unauthentic, and
not found in any trustworthy collection of the traditions.
Such is the bearing and
the possible danger of mathematics.
(2) Logic. This
science, in the same manner,[31] contains nothing for or against religion. Its
object is the study of different kinds of proofs and syllogisms, the conditions
which should hold between the premises of a proposition, the way to combine
them, the rules of a good definition, and the art of formulating it. For
knowledge consists of conceptions which spring from a definition or of
convictions which arise from proofs. There is therefore nothing censurable in
this science, and it is laid under contribution by theologians as well as by
philosophers. The only difference is that the latter use a particular set of
technical formulæ and that they push their divisions and subdivisions further.
It may be asked, What,
then, this has to do with the grave questions of religion, and on what ground
opposition should be offered to the methods of logic? The objector, it will be
said, can only inspire the logician with an unfavourable opinion of the
intelligence and faith of his adversary, since the latter’s faith seems to be
based upon such objections. But, it must be admitted, logic is liable to abuse.
Logicians demand in reasoning certain conditions which lead to absolute
certainty, but when they touch on religious questions, they can no longer postulate
these conditions, and ought therefore to relax their habitual rigour. It
happens, accordingly, that a student who is enamoured of the evidential methods
of logic, hearing his teachers accused of irreligion, believes that[32] this
irreligion reposes on proofs as strong as those of logic, and immediately,
without attempting the study of metaphysics, shares their mistake. This is a
serious disadvantage arising from the study of logic.
(3) Physics. The object
of this science is the study of the bodies which compose the universe: the sky
and the stars, and, here below, simple elements such as air, earth, water,
fire, and compound bodies—animals, plants and minerals; the reasons of their
changes, developments, and intermixture. By the nature of its researches it is
closely connected with the study of medicine, the object of which is the human
body, its principal and secondary organs, and the law which governs their
changes. Religion having no fault to find with medical science cannot justly do
so with physical, except on some special matters which we have mentioned in the
work entitled The Destruction of the Philosophers. Besides these primary
questions, there are some subordinate ones depending on them, on which physical
science is open to objection. But all physical science rests, as we believe, on
the following principle: Nature is entirely subject to God; incapable of acting
by itself, it is an instrument in the hand of the Creator; sun, moon, stars,
and elements are subject to God and can produce nothing of themselves. In a
word, nothing in nature can act spontaneously and apart from God.
[33]
(4) Metaphysics. This
is the fruitful breeding-ground of the errors of philosophers. Here they can no
longer satisfy the laws of rigorous argumentation such as logic demands, and
this is what explains the disputes which arise between them in the study of
metaphysics. The system most closely akin to the system of the Muhammedan
doctors is that of Aristotle as expounded to us by Farabi and Avicenna. The sum
total of their errors can be reduced to twenty propositions: three of them are
irreligious, and the other seventeen heretical. It was in order to combat their
system that we wrote the work Destruction of the Philosophers. The three
propositions in which they are opposed to all the doctrines of Islam are the
following:
(1) Bodies do not rise
again; spirits alone will be rewarded or punished; future punishments will be
therefore spiritual and not physical. They are right in admitting spiritual
punishments, for there will be such; but they are wrong in rejecting physical
punishments, and contradicting in this manner the assertions of the Divine Law.
(2) “God takes
cognisance of universals, not of specials.” This is manifestly irreligious. The
Koran asserts truly, “Not an atom’s weight in heaven or earth can escape His
knowledge” (x. 62).
(3) They maintain that
the universe exists from all eternity and will never end.
[34]
None of these
propositions have ever been admitted by Moslems.
Besides this, they deny
that God has attributes, and maintain that He knows by His essence only and not
by means of any attribute accessory to His essence. In this point they approach
the doctrine of the Mutazilites, doctrines which we are not obliged to condemn
as irreligious. On the contrary, in our work entitled Criteria of the
differences which divide Islam from Atheism, we have proved the wrongness of
those who accuse of irreligion everything which is opposed to their way of
looking at things.
(5) Political Science.
The professors of this confine themselves to drawing up the rules which
regulate temporal matters and the royal power. They have borrowed their
theories on this point from the books which God has revealed to His prophets
and from the sentences of ancient sages, gathered by tradition.
(6) Moral Philosophy.
The professors of this occupy themselves with defining the attributes and
qualities of the soul, grouping them according to genus and species, and
pointing out the way to moderate and control them. They have borrowed this
system from the Sufis. These devout men, who are always engaged in invoking the
name of God, in combating concupiscence and following the way of God by
renouncing the pleasures of this world, have received, while in a state of[35]
ecstasy, revelations regarding the qualities of the soul, its defects and its
evil inclinations. These revelations they have published, and the philosophers
making use of them have introduced them into their own systems in order to
embellish and give currency to their falsehoods. In the times of the
philosophers, as at every other period, there existed some of these fervent
mystics. God does not deprive this world of them, for they are its sustainers,
and they draw down to it the blessings of heaven according to the tradition: “It
is by them that you obtain rain, it is by them that you receive your
subsistence.” Such were “the Companions of the Cave,” who lived in ancient
times, as related by the Koran (xviii.). Now this mixture of moral and
philosophic doctrine with the words of the Prophet and those of the Sufis gives
rise to two dangers, one for the upholder of those doctrines, the other for
their opponent.
The danger for their
opponent is serious. A narrow-minded man, finding in their writings moral
philosophy mixed with unsupported theories, believes that he ought to entirely
reject them and to condemn those who profess them. Having only heard them from
their mouth he does not hesitate in his ignorance to declare them false because
those who teach them are in error. It is as if some one was to reject the
profession of faith made by Christians, “There is only one God[36] and Jesus is
His prophet,” simply because it proceeds from Christians and without inquiring
whether it is the profession of this creed or the denial of Muhammed’s
prophetic mission which makes Christians infidels. Now, if they are only
infidels because of their rejection of our prophet, we are not entitled to
reject those of their doctrines which do not wear the stamp of infidelity. In a
word, truth does not cease to be true because it is found among them. Such,
however, is the tendency of weak minds: they judge the truth according to its
professors instead of judging its professors by the standard of the truth. But
a liberal spirit will take as its guide this maxim of the Prince of believers,
Ali the son of Abu Talib: “Do not seek for the truth by means of men; find
first the truth and then you will recognise those who follow it.” This is the
procedure followed by a wise man. Once in possession of the truth he examines
the basis of various doctrines which come before him, and when he has found
them true, he accepts them without troubling himself whether the person who
teaches them is sincere or a deceiver. Much rather, remembering how gold is
buried in the bowels of the earth, he endeavours to disengage the truth from
the mass of errors in which it is engulfed. The skilled coin-assayer plunges
without hesitation his hand into the purse of the coiner of false money, and,
relying on experience, separates good coins[37] from bad. It is the ignorant
rustic, and not the experienced assayer, who will ask why we should have
anything to do with a false coiner. The unskilled swimmer must be kept away
from the seashore, not the expert in diving. The child, not the charmer, must
be forbidden to handle serpents.
As a matter of fact,
men have such a good opinion of themselves, of their mental superiority and
intellectual depth; they believe themselves so skilled in discerning the true
from the false, the path of safety from those of error, that they should be
forbidden as much as possible the perusal of philosophic writings, for though
they sometimes escape the danger just pointed out, they cannot avoid that which
we are about to indicate.
Some of the maxims
found in my works regarding the mysteries of religion have met with objectors
of an inferior rank in science, whose intellectual penetration is insufficient
to fathom such depths. They assert that these maxims are borrowed from the
ancient philosophers, whereas the truth is that they are the fruit of my own
meditations, but as the proverb says, “Sandal follows the impress of
sandal.”[1] Some of them are found in our books of religious law, but the
greater part are derived from the writings of the Sufis.
But even if they were
borrowed exclusively[38] from the doctrines of the philosophers, is it right to
reject an opinion when it is reasonable in itself, supported by solid proofs,
and contradicting neither the Koran nor the traditions? If we adopt this method
and reject every truth which has chanced to have been proclaimed by an
impostor, how many truths we should have to reject! How many verses of the
Koran and traditions of the prophets and Sufi discourses and maxims of sages we
must close our ears to because the author of the Treatise of the Brothers of
Purity has inserted them in his writings in order to further his cause, and in
order to lead minds gradually astray in the paths of error! The consequence of
this procedure would be that impostors would snatch truths out of our hands in
order to embellish their own works. The wise man, at least, should not make
common cause with the bigot blinded by ignorance.
Honey does not become
impure because it may happen to have been placed in the glass which the surgeon
uses for cupping purposes. The impurity of blood is due, not to its contact
with this glass, but to a peculiarity inherent in its own nature; this
peculiarity, not existing in honey, cannot be communicated to it by its being
placed in the cupping glass; it is therefore wrong to regard it as impure. Such
is, however, the whimsical way of looking at things found in nearly all men.
Every word proceeding from an authority[39] which they approve is accepted by
them, even were it false; every word proceeding from one whom they suspect is
rejected, even were it true. In every case they judge of the truth according to
its professors and not of men according to the truth which they profess, a ne
plus ultra of error. Such is the peril in which philosophy involves its
opponents.
The second danger
threatens those who accept the opinions of the philosophers. When, for
instance, we read the treatises of the “Brothers of purity” and other works of
the same kind, we find in them sentences spoken by the Prophet and quotations
from the Sufis. We approve these works; we give them our confidence; and we
finish by accepting the errors which they contain, because of the good opinion
of them with which they have inspired us at the outset. Thus, by insensible
degrees, we are led astray. In view of this danger the reading of philosophic
writings so full of vain and delusive utopias should be forbidden, just as the
slippery banks of a river are forbidden to one who knows not how to swim. The
perusal of these false teachings must be prevented just as one prevents
children from touching serpents. A snake-charmer himself will abstain from
touching snakes in the presence of his young child, because he knows that the
child, believing himself as clever as his father, will not fail to imitate him;
and in order to lend more[40] weight to his prohibition the charmer will not
touch a serpent under the eyes of his son.
Such should be the
conduct of a learned man who is also wise. But the snake-charmer, after having
taken the serpent and separated the venom from the antidote, having put the
latter on one side and destroyed the venom, ought not to withhold the antidote
from those who need it. In the same way the skilled coin-assayer, after having
put his hand in the bag of the false coiner, taken out the good coins and
thrown away the bad ones, ought not to refuse the good to those who need and
ask for it. Such should be the conduct of the learned man. If the patient feels
a certain dislike of the antidote because he knows that it is taken from a
snake whose body is the receptacle of poison, he should be disabused of his
fallacy. If a beggar hesitates to take a piece of gold which he knows comes
from the purse of a false coiner, he should be told that his hesitation is a
pure mistake which would deprive him of the advantage which he seeks. It should
be proved to him that the contact of the good coins with the bad does not
injure the former and does not improve the latter. In the same way the contact
of truth with falsehood does not change truth into falsehood, any more than it
changes falsehood into truth.
Thus much, then, we
have to say regarding the inconveniences and dangers which spring from the
study of philosophy.
[41]
Sufism
When I had finished my
examination of these doctrines I applied myself to the study of Sufism. I saw
that in order to understand it thoroughly one must combine theory with
practice. The aim which the Sufis set before them is as follows: To free the
soul from the tyrannical yoke of the passions, to deliver it from its wrong
inclinations and evil instincts, in order that in the purified heart there
should only remain room for God and for the invocation of His holy name.
As it was more easy to
learn their doctrine than to practise it, I studied first of all those of their
books which contain it: The Nourishment of Hearts, by Abu Talib of Mecca, the
works of Hareth el Muhasibi, and the fragments which still remain of Junaid,
Shibli, Abu Yezid Bustami and other leaders (whose souls may God sanctify). I
acquired a thorough knowledge of their researches, and I learned all that was
possible to learn of their methods by study and oral teaching. It became clear
to me that the last stage could not be reached by mere instruction, but only by
transport, ecstasy, and the transformation of the moral being.
To define health and
satiety, to penetrate their causes and conditions, is quite another thing from
being well and satisfied. To define drunkenness,[42] to know that it is caused
by vapours which rise from the stomach and cloud the seat of intelligence, is
quite a different thing to being drunk. The drunken man has no idea of the
nature of drunkenness, just because he is drunk and not in a condition to
understand anything, while the doctor, not being under the influence of
drunkenness, knows its character and laws. Or if the doctor fall ill, he has a
theoretical knowledge of the health of which he is deprived.
In the same way there
is a considerable difference between knowing renouncement, comprehending its
conditions and causes, and practising renouncement and detachment from the
things of this world. I saw that Sufism consists in experiences rather than in
definitions, and that what I was lacking belonged to the domain, not of
instruction, but of ecstasy and initiation.
The researches to which
I had devoted myself, the path which I had traversed in studying religious and
speculative branches of knowledge, had given me a firm faith in three
things—God, Inspiration, and the Last Judgment. These three fundamental
articles of belief were confirmed in me, not merely by definite arguments, but
by a chain of causes, circumstances, and proofs which it is impossible to
recount. I saw that one can only hope for salvation by devotion and the
conquest of one’s passions, a procedure which presupposes renouncement and detachment
from[43] this world of falsehood in order to turn towards eternity and
meditation on God. Finally, I saw that the only condition of success was to
sacrifice honours and riches and to sever the ties and attachments of worldly
life.
Coming seriously to
consider my state, I found myself bound down on all sides by these trammels.
Examining my actions, the most fair-seeming of which were my lecturing and
professorial occupations, I found to my surprise that I was engrossed in
several studies of little value, and profitless as regards my salvation. I
probed the motives of my teaching and found that, in place of being sincerely
consecrated to God, it was only actuated by a vain desire of honour and
reputation. I perceived that I was on the edge of an abyss, and that without an
immediate conversion I should be doomed to eternal fire. In these reflections I
spent a long time. Still a prey to uncertainty, one day I decided to leave
Bagdad and to give up everything; the next day I gave up my resolution. I advanced
one step and immediately relapsed. In the morning I was sincerely resolved only
to occupy myself with the future life; in the evening a crowd of carnal
thoughts assailed and dispersed my resolutions. On the one side the world kept
me bound to my post in the chains of covetousness, on the other side the voice
of religion cried to me, “Up! Up! thy life is nearing its end, and thou hast a
long journey to make.[44] All thy pretended knowledge is nought but falsehood
and fantasy. If thou dost not think now of thy salvation, when wilt thou think
of it? If thou dost not break thy chains to-day, when wilt thou break them?”
Then my resolve was strengthened, I wished to give up all and flee; but the
Tempter, returning to the attack, said, “You are suffering from a transitory
feeling; don’t give way to it, for it will soon pass. If you obey it, if you
give up this fine position, this honourable post exempt from trouble and
rivalry, this seat of authority safe from attack, you will regret it later on
without being able to recover it.”
Thus I remained, torn
asunder by the opposite forces of earthly passions and religious aspirations,
for about six months from the month Rajab of the year a.d. 1096. At the close
of them my will yielded and I gave myself up to destiny. God caused an
impediment to chain my tongue and prevented me from lecturing. Vainly I
desired, in the interest of my pupils, to go on with my teaching, but my mouth
became dumb. The silence to which I was condemned cast me into a violent
despair; my stomach became weak; I lost all appetite; I could neither swallow a
morsel of bread nor drink a drop of water.
The enfeeblement of my
physical powers was such that the doctors, despairing of saving me, said, “The
mischief is in the heart, and has communicated itself to the whole organism;
there[45] is no hope unless the cause of his grievous sadness be arrested.”
Finally, conscious of
my weakness and the prostration of my soul, I took refuge in God as a man at
the end of himself and without resources. “He who hears the wretched when they
cry” (Koran, xxvii. 63) deigned to hear me; He made easy to me the sacrifice of
honours, wealth, and family. I gave out publicly that I intended to make the
pilgrimage to Mecca, while I secretly resolved to go to Syria, not wishing that
the Caliph (may God magnify him) or my friends should know my intention of
settling in that country. I made all kinds of clever excuses for leaving Bagdad
with the fixed intention of not returning thither. The Imāms of Irak criticised
me with one accord. Not one of them could admit that this sacrifice had a
religious motive, because they considered my position as the highest attainable
in the religious community. “Behold how far their knowledge goes!” (Koran,
liii. 31). All kinds of explanations of my conduct were forthcoming. Those who
were outside the limits of Irak attributed it to the fear with which the
Government inspired me. Those who were on the spot and saw how the authorities
wished to detain me, their displeasure at my resolution and my refusal of their
request, said to themselves, “It is a calamity which one can only impute to a
fate which has befallen the Faithful and Learning!”
[46]
At last I left Bagdad,
giving up all my fortune. Only, as lands and property in Irak can afford an
endowment for pious purposes, I obtained a legal authorisation to preserve as
much as was necessary for my support and that of my children; for there is
surely nothing more lawful in the world than that a learned man should provide
sufficient to support his family. I then betook myself to Syria, where I
remained for two years, which I devoted to retirement, meditation, and devout
exercises. I only thought of self-improvement and discipline and of
purification of the heart by prayer in going through the forms of devotion
which the Sufis had taught me. I used to live a solitary life in the Mosque of
Damascus, and was in the habit of spending my days on the minaret after closing
the door behind me.
From thence I proceeded
to Jerusalem, and every day secluded myself in the Sanctuary of the Rock.[2]
After that I felt a desire to accomplish the Pilgrimage, and to receive a full
effusion of grace by visiting Mecca, Medina, and the Tomb of the Prophet. After
visiting the shrine of the Friend of God (Abraham), I went to the Hedjāz.
Finally, the longings of my heart and the prayers of my children brought me
back to my country, although I was so firmly resolved at first never to revisit
it. At any rate I meant, if I did return, to live there solitary and in
religious meditation;[47] but events, family cares, and vicissitudes of life
changed my resolutions and troubled my meditative calm. However irregular the
intervals which I could give to devotional ecstasy, my confidence in it did not
diminish; and the more I was diverted by hindrances, the more steadfastly I
returned to it.
Ten years passed in
this manner. During my successive periods of meditation there were revealed to
me things impossible to recount. All that I shall say for the edification of
the reader is this: I learnt from a sure source that the Sufis are the true
pioneers on the path of God; that there is nothing more beautiful than their
life, nor more praiseworthy than their rule of conduct, nor purer than their
morality. The intelligence of thinkers, the wisdom of philosophers, the
knowledge of the most learned doctors of the law would in vain combine their
efforts in order to modify or improve their doctrine and morals; it would be
impossible. With the Sufis, repose and movement, exterior or interior, are illumined
with the light which proceeds from the Central Radiance of Inspiration. And
what other light could shine on the face of the earth? In a word, what can one
criticise in them? To purge the heart of all that does not belong to God is the
first step in their cathartic method. The drawing up of the heart by prayer is
the keystone of it, as the cry “Allahu Akbar” (God is great) is the
keystone[48] of prayer, and the last stage is the being lost in God. I say the
last stage, with reference to what may be reached by an effort of will; but, to
tell the truth, it is only the first stage in the life of contemplation, the
vestibule by which the initiated enter.
From the time that they
set out on this path, revelations commence for them. They come to see in the
waking state angels and souls of prophets; they hear their voices and wise
counsels. By means of this contemplation of heavenly forms and images they rise
by degrees to heights which human language cannot reach, which one cannot even
indicate without falling into great and inevitable errors. The degree of
proximity to Deity which they attain is regarded by some as intermixture of
being (haloul), by others as identification (ittihād), by others as intimate
union (wasl). But all these expressions are wrong, as we have explained in our
work entitled The Chief Aim. Those who have reached that stage should confine
themselves to repeating the verse—
What I experience I
shall not try to say;
Call me happy, but ask
me no more.
In short, he who does
not arrive at the intuition of these truths by means of ecstasy, knows only the
name of inspiration. The miracles wrought by the saints are, in fact, merely
the earliest forms of prophetic manifestation. Such[49] was the state of the
Apostle of God when, before receiving his commission, he retired to Mount Hira
to give himself up to such intensity of prayer and meditation that the Arabs
said: “Muhammed is become enamoured of God.”
This state, then, can
be revealed to the initiated in ecstasy, and to him who is incapable of ecstasy,
by obedience and attention, on condition that he frequents the society of Sufis
till he arrives, so to speak, at an imitative initiation. Such is the faith
which one can obtain by remaining among them, and intercourse with them is
never painful.
But even when we are
deprived of the advantage of their society, we can comprehend the possibility
of this state (revelation by means of ecstasy) by a chain of manifest proofs.
We have explained this in the treatise entitled Marvels of the Heart, which forms
part of our work, The Revival of the Religious Sciences. The certitude derived
from proofs is called “knowledge”; passing into the state we describe is called
“transport”; believing the experience of others and oral transmission is
“faith.” Such are the three degrees of knowledge, as it is written, “The Lord
will raise to different ranks those among you who have believed and those who
have received knowledge from Him” (Koran, lviii. 12).
But behind those who
believe comes a crowd of ignorant people who deny the reality of Sufism, hear
discourses on it with incredulous irony, and[50] treat as charlatans those who
profess it. To this ignorant crowd the verse applies: “There are those among
them who come to listen to thee, and when they leave thee, ask of those who
have received knowledge, ‘What has he just said?’ These are they whose hearts
God has sealed up with blindness and who only follow their passions.”
Among the number of
convictions which I owe to the practice of the Sufi rule is the knowledge of the
true nature of inspiration. This knowledge is of such great importance that I
proceed to expound it in detail.
The Reality of
Inspiration: its Importance for the Human Race
The substance of man at
the moment of its creation is a simple monad, devoid of knowledge of the worlds
subject to the Creator, worlds whose infinite number is only known to Him, as
the Koran says: “Only thy Lord knoweth the number of His armies.”
Man arrives at this
knowledge by the aid of his perceptions; each of his senses is given him that
he may comprehend the world of created things, and by the term “world” we
understand the different species of creatures. The first sense revealed to man
is touch, by means of which he perceives a certain group of qualities—heat,
cold, moist, dry. The sense of touch does not[51] perceive colours and forms,
which are for it as though they did not exist. Next comes the sense of sight,
which makes him acquainted with colours and forms; that is to say, with that
which occupies the highest rank in the world of sensation. The sense of hearing
succeeds, and then the senses of smell and taste.
When the human being
can elevate himself above the world of sense, towards the age of seven, he
receives the faculty of discrimination; he enters then upon a new phase of
existence and can experience, thanks to this faculty, impressions, superior to
those of the senses, which do not occur in the sphere of sensation.
He then passes to
another phase and receives reason, by which he discerns things necessary,
possible, and impossible; in a word, all the notions which he could not combine
in the former stages of his existence. But beyond reason and at a higher level
a new faculty of vision is bestowed upon him, by which he perceives invisible
things, the secrets of the future and other concepts as inaccessible to reason
as the concepts of reason are inaccessible to mere discrimination and what is
perceived by discrimination to the senses. Just as the man possessed only of
discrimination rejects and denies the notions acquired by reason, so do certain
rationalists reject and deny the notion of inspiration. It is a proof of their
profound ignorance; for, instead of argument, they[52] merely deny inspiration
as a sphere unknown and possessing no real existence. In the same way, a man
blind from birth, who knows neither by experience nor by information what
colours and forms are, neither knows nor understands them when some one speaks
of them to him for the first time.
God, wishing to render
intelligible to men the idea of inspiration, has given them a kind of glimpse
of it in sleep. In fact, man perceives while asleep the things of the invisible
world either clearly manifest or under the veil of allegory to be subsequently
lifted by divination. If, however, one was to say to a person who had never
himself experienced these dreams that, in a state of lethargy resembling death
and during the complete suspension of sight, hearing, and all the senses, a man
can see the things of the invisible world, this person would exclaim, and seek
to prove the impossibility of these visions by some such argument as the
following: “The sensitive faculties are the causes of perception. Now, if one
can perceive certain things when one is in full possession of these faculties,
how much more is their perception impossible when these faculties are
suspended.”
The falsity of such an
argument is shown by evidence and experience. For in the same way as reason
constitutes a particular phase of existence in which intellectual concepts are
perceived[53] which are hidden from the senses, similarly, inspiration is a
special state in which the inner eye discovers, revealed by a celestial light,
mysteries out of the reach of reason. The doubts which are raised regarding
inspiration relate (1) to its possibility, (2) to its real and actual
existence, (3) to its manifestation in this or that person.
To prove the
possibility of inspiration is to prove that it belongs to a category of
branches of knowledge which cannot be attained by reason. It is the same with
medical science and astronomy. He who studies them is obliged to recognise that
they are derived solely from the revelation and special grace of God. Some
astronomical phenomena only occur once in a thousand years; how then can we
know them by experience?
We may say the same of
inspiration, which is one of the branches of intuitional knowledge. Further,
the perception of things which are beyond the attainment of reason is only one
of the features peculiar to inspiration, which possesses a great number of others.
The characteristic which we have mentioned is only, as it were, a drop of water
in the ocean, and we have mentioned it because people experience what is
analogous to it in dreams and in the sciences of medicine and astronomy. These
branches of knowledge belong to the domain of prophetic miracles, and reason
cannot attain to them.
As to the other
characteristics of inspiration,[54] they are only revealed to adepts in Sufism
and in a state of ecstatic transport. The little that we know of the nature of inspiration
we owe to the kind of likeness to it which we find in sleep; without that we
should be incapable of comprehending it, and consequently of believing in it,
for conviction results from comprehension. The process of initiation into
Sufism exhibits this likeness to inspiration from the first. There is in it a
kind of ecstasy proportioned to the condition of the person initiated, and a
degree of certitude and conviction which cannot be attained by reason. This
single fact is sufficient to make us believe in inspiration.
We now come to deal
with doubts relative to the inspiration of a particular prophet. We shall not
arrive at certitude on this point except by ascertaining, either by ocular
evidence or by reliable tradition, the facts relating to that prophet. When we
have ascertained the real nature of inspiration and proceed to the serious
study of the Koran and the traditions, we shall then know certainly that
Muhammed is the greatest of prophets. After that we should fortify our
conviction by verifying the truth of his preaching and the salutary effect
which it has upon the soul. We should verify in experience the truth of
sentences such as the following: “He who makes his conduct accord with his
knowledge receives from God more[55] knowledge”; or this, “God delivers to the
oppressor him who favours injustice”; or again, “Whosoever when rising in the
morning has only one anxiety (to please God), God will preserve him from all
anxiety in this world and the next.”
When we have verified
these sayings in experience thousands of times, we shall be in possession of a
certitude on which doubt can obtain no hold. Such is the path we must traverse
in order to realise the truth of inspiration. It is not a question of finding
out whether a rod has been changed into a serpent, or whether the moon has been
split in two.[3] If we regard miracles in isolation, without their countless
attendant circumstances, we shall be liable to confound them with magic and
falsehood, or to regard them as a means of leading men astray, as it is
written, “God misleads and directs as He chooses” (Koran, xxxv. 9); we shall
find ourselves involved in all the difficulties which the question of miracles
raises. If, for instance, we believe that eloquence of style is a proof of
inspiration, it is possible that an eloquent style composed with this object
may inspire us with a false belief in the inspiration of him who wields it. The
supernatural should be only one of the constituents which go to form our
belief, without our placing too much reliance on this or that detail. We should
rather resemble[56] a person who, learning a fact from a group of people,
cannot point to this or that particular man as his informant, and who, not
distinguishing between them, cannot explain precisely how his conviction
regarding the fact has been formed.
Such are the
characteristics of scientific certitude. As to the transport which permits men
to see the truth and, so to speak, to handle it, it is only known to the Sufis.
What I have just said regarding the true nature of inspiration is sufficient
for the aim which I have proposed to myself. I may return to the subject later,
if necessary.
I pass now to the
causes of the decay of faith and show the means of bringing back those who have
erred and of preserving them from the dangers which threaten them. To those who
doubt because they are tinctured with the doctrine of the Ta’limites, my
treatise entitled The Just Balance affords a sufficient guide; therefore it is
unnecessary to return to the subject here.
As to the vain theories
of the Ibahat, I have grouped them in seven classes, and explained them in the
work entitled Alchemy of Happiness. For those whose faith has been undermined
by philosophy, so far that they deny the reality of inspiration, we have proved
the truth and necessity of it, seeking our proofs in the hidden properties of
medicines and of the heavenly bodies. It is for them that we have written this
treatise, and the reason for our seeking for proofs[57] in the sciences of
medicine and of astronomy is because these sciences belong to the domain of
philosophy. All those branches of knowledge which our opponents boast
of—astronomy, medicine, physics, and divination—provide us with arguments in
favour of the Prophet.
As to those who,
professing a lip-faith in the Prophet, adulterate religion with philosophy,
they really deny inspiration, since in their view the Prophet is only a sage
whom a superior destiny has appointed as guide to men, and this view belies the
true nature of inspiration. To believe in the Prophet is to admit that there is
above intelligence a sphere in which are revealed to the inner vision truths
beyond the grasp of intelligence, just as things seen are not apprehended by
the sense of hearing, nor things understood by that of touch. If our opponent
denies the existence of such a higher region, we can prove to him, not only its
possibility, but its actuality. If, on the contrary, he admits its existence,
he recognises at the same time that there are in that sphere things which reason
cannot grasp; nay, which reason rejects as false and absurd. Suppose, for
instance, that the fact of dreams occurring in sleep were not so common and
notorious as it is, our wise men would not fail to repudiate the assertion that
the secrets of the invisible world can be revealed while the senses are, so to
speak, suspended.
[58]
Again, if it were to be
said to one of them, “Is it possible that there is in the world a thing as
small as a grain, which being carried into a city can destroy it and afterwards
destroy itself so that nothing remains either of the city or of itself?”
“Certainly,” he would exclaim, “it is impossible and ridiculous.” Such,
however, is the effect of fire, which would certainly be disputed by one who
had not witnessed it with his own eyes. Now, the refusal to believe in the
mysteries of the other life is of the same kind.
As to the fourth cause
of the spread of unbelief—the decay of faith owing to the bad example set by
learned men—there are three ways of checking it.
(1) One can answer
thus: “The learned man whom you accuse of disobeying the divine law knows that
he disobeys, as you do when you drink wine or exact usury or allow yourself in
evil-speaking, lying, and slander. You know your sin and yield to it, not
through ignorance, but because you are mastered by concupiscence. The same is
the case with the learned man. How many believe in doctors who do not abstain
from fruit and cold water when strictly forbidden them by a doctor! That does
not prove that those things are not dangerous, or that their faith in the
doctor was not solidly established. Similar errors on the part of learned men
are to be imputed solely to their weakness.”
[59]
(2) Or again, one may
say to a simple and ignorant man: “The learned man reckons upon his knowledge
as a viaticum for the next life. He believes that his knowledge will save him
and plead in his favour, and that his intellectual superiority will entitle him
to indulgence; lastly, that if his knowledge increases his responsibility, it
may also entitle him to a higher degree of consideration. All that is possible;
and even if the learned man has neglected practice, he can at any rate produce
proofs of his knowledge. But you, poor, witless one, if, like him, you neglect
practice, destitute as you are of knowledge, you will perish without anything
to plead in your favour.”
(3) Or one may answer,
and this reason is the true one: “The truly learned man only sins through
carelessness, and does not remain in a state of impenitence. For real knowledge
shows sin to be a deadly poison, and the other world to be superior to this.
Convinced of this truth, man ought not to exchange the precious for the vile.
But the knowledge of which we speak is not derived from sources accessible to
human diligence, and that is why progress in mere worldly knowledge renders the
sinner more hardened in his revolt against God.
True knowledge, on the
contrary, inspires in him who is initiate in it more fear and more reverence,
and raises a barrier of defence between[60] him and sin. He may slip and
stumble, it is true, as is inevitable with one encompassed by human infirmity,
but these slips and stumbles will not weaken his faith. The true Moslem
succumbs occasionally to temptation, but he repents and will not persevere
obstinately in the path of error.
I pray God the
Omnipotent to place us in the ranks of His chosen, among the number of those
whom He directs in the path of safety, in whom He inspires fervour lest they
forget Him; whom He cleanses from all defilement, that nothing may remain in
them except Himself; yea, of those whom He indwells completely, that they may
adore none beside Him.
FOOTNOTES
[1]I.e. There is
nothing new under the sun.
[2]In the Mosque of
Omar.
[3]A miracle ascribed
to Muhammed.
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